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wurde, bereitet unter unseren gegenwärtigen politischen Verhältnissen dem einzi­
gen kommunistischen Mitglied der Autorenreihe unverhohlene Mühe. Wolfgang 
Rüge greift also Stresemann wegen seiner Revisionspolitik scharf an, weil sich die 
Sowjetunion zu jeder Revisionspolitik nach 1945 ganz anders stellte, als sie sich 
nach 1918 gestellt hat. Das ist Geschichtsschreibung unter dem eindeutigen Ge­
sichtspunkt politischer Konvenienz. Wie aber leitet Rüge seinen Beitrag ein? „Das 
nahezu unerschöpfliche Reservoir der Historie hat der Politik seit jeher zur Be­
gründung ihrer Ziele, zur Legitimierung ihrer Ansprüche, zur Rechtfertigung ihrer 
Methoden gedient." Rüge meint aber offensichtlich nicht sich selbst, sondern die 
Apologeten Stresemanns im Westen, insbesondere in der Bundesrepublik. 
Als ein Mangel des Buches erscheint das Fehlen biographischer Angaben über die 
Verfasser. Jedenfalls hätte der Autor dieser Besprechung solche Hinweise als hilf­
reich empfunden. 
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Ivan Sviták, now a resident of California, was, during the Prague Spring, an 
unorthodox but not uninfluential philosopher. He was one of the inspirators of 
KAN (the Club of Engaged Non-Party People) and was, moreover, instrumental 
in bringing the unresolved violent death of Jan Masaryk to the attention of the 
Czech public. Incidentally, circumstantial evidence which emerged in the West 
gradually after 1948 and in Prague in 1968 strongly suggests that Masaryk had 
been murdered by Soviet agents. 
The concise book Velký Skluz [The Big Slide] is a historical analysis without 
references or footnotes, but hardly less impressive for that. Presented in a readable, 
even thrilling manner, it is in the first place a warning to western liberals intended 
to demonstrate that appeasement policies toward burocratic dictatorships are a 
road to capitulation, sovietization, in the long run even possibly to national anni-
hilation. It is also a polemic with officious Czech exile historiographers who tried 
and to an extent still try to demonstrate that all the blame for Czech misfortunes 
and failures should be primarily attributed to „the West". 
Sviták begins with the Czechoslovak capitulation of 1938 when Edvard Beneš 
unwillingly accepted the Munich Agreement, thus refusing to risk an armed defence 
of his country. Beneš never forgot this failure and projected the „guilt" to the 
West, particularly to the British, even after the appeasers Chamberlain and Hali­
fax had been replaced by Churchill and Eden. Though he had to resign from office, 
he did not lose hope. He was sure that a world war was inevitable. The greater 
part of the Czech nation and a decisive segment of the political elite continued to 
trust him in the following years. 
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After the Munich Agreement and more vocally after March 1939 Beneš predic-
ted that appeasement by the western powers would not stop Hitler. His foresight 
was correct and the 2nd World War began a year after the Munich Agreement. 
In spite of the Nazi-Soviet collusion of August 1939 about the spheres of influence 
and the division of Poland, Beneš did not cease to predict that the Soviet Union 
would enter the war side by side with the western democracies. In June 1941 
Hitler fulfilled Benes's prediction. And the (former) Czechoslovak President 
was also sure that the United States would participate, as they did since December 
1941. All this strengthened Benes's position further, both within the Czech exile 
and in relation to allied governments. 
The main, one might say traumatic, preoccupation of Edvard Beneš was the 
effort to have the 1938 Munich Agreement declared null and void ab initio, a 
juridical step which would ensure that his own subsequent resignation from presi-
dential office was invalid too. Understandably enough, the pragmatic British 
hesitated to comply with this lawyer's trick and did not want to commit them-
selves prematurely to a recognition of the pre-1938 Czechoslovak borders either. 
All this strengthened Benes's antipathies. Later on the British were also far from 
enthusiastic about the Czech governmental proposition to expell the major part of 
the ethnic Germans from postwar Czechoslovakia. As of the summer of 1941 the 
Soviets did not entertain such compunctions. 
Svitak's book lucidly describes the setup of world politics and the Overall 
military Situation at every relevant stage. The author does not hesitate to outline 
the limitations and misconceptions, particularly of the U. S. presidents and top 
military Commanders vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, he 
shows that the Czechoslovak exile government and Edvard Beneš in particular 
had their own options at each crossroad. And, unfailingly, at every instance they 
chose a pro-Soviet course. 
Beneš did not do so out of any pro-communist or even pro-Soviet sympathies, 
but on the basis of a cool calculation. He expected that the USSR would play a 
major role in postwar Central Europe, and trusted that Stalin would reward his 
co-operation by conceding to the Czechs adequate internal freedoms in return for 
a faithful co-operation in foreign policy. Obviously, this belief was founded on a 
mistaken expectation of a lasting friendship between the major victorious powers, 
and especially on a fateful misapprehension of Stalinism. 
The Czech president began to co-operate with Soviet representatives in London 
at a time when the USSR still maintained a benevolent neutrality toward Nazi 
Germany. Soon after Hitler's attack on the USSR Beneš initiated the 1941 
Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and mutual assistance treaty. At a time difficult 
for the Polish exile government in London he squashed the British-sponsored plan 
of a Czechoslovak-Polish confederation which was disliked by the Soviets. A climax 
was his Moscow visit in December 1943 which Beneš prepared against outspoken 
British misgivings. „The Moscow treaty (of 1943) definitely undid Munich, this 
western betrayal of the Czechs. But by the Moscow treaty ,the Czechs' betrayed 
the West" (p. 89). 
In March 1945 Beneš hurried to Moscow again, accompanied by most of his 
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ministers. Instead of maintaining his freedom of action at the conclusion of the war 
when he might have accomplished the possibly crucial liberation of Prague by U.S. 
troops or by the Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade from the West, he found himself 
isolated in a Soviet trap. He wanted to return home via the Soviet Union and 
expected Soviet gratitude. „In špite of persistent myths that the West had written 
off Czechoslovakia, the truth remains that the Czechoslovak exile government has 
itself written off the ČSR as a part of the West" (p. 95). 
During the 1945 negotiations in Moscow Beneš acted as a non-party president 
and left the discussions and decisions to his ministers from London, urging them 
only to come to an agreement with the Czech communist group in Moscow headed 
by Gottwald. The result was the Košice Program and a governmental setup 
which gave several crucial posts to the communists. 
The „big slide" continued by presidential decrees, especially those concerning 
nationalization, the national committees, the prohibition of the Agrarian Party, 
monopolization of power within an Oligarchie party setup, and by the expulsion 
of the Germans. Sviták comments: „. . . the most powerful stimulus of the slide 
was where nobody would have sought it at the time — in the expulsion of the 
Germans . . . they lost (everything) as a result of carefully prepared actions of a 
liberal humanitarian and demoerat, Edvard Beneš" (p. 120). As a consequence, 
similar violations of basic human rights were to become the fate of the Czechs 
themselves within a couple of years. 
Sviták recapitulates the known events of 1945—1948 which culminated in the 
total defeat of the „democrats" and Edvard Beneš himself in latě February 1948. 
They were followed by the violent death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk a 
fortnight later. The author considers the tragic fiasco of February 1948 to have 
been a logical consequence of the previous collaboration with the Soviets on the 
part of the „liberal democrats". Under worse conditions than the Czechs, Sviták 
argues, the Finns, the Israelis and the Yugoslavs succeeded in protecting their 
statě independence. He concludes that the statě and the nation, if confronted with 
expansionist and buroeratic dictatorships, must be prepared to defend their inde­
pendence and their freedom even by force of arms. 
A political analysis of this kind can hardly avoid some mistakes in detail, some 
Statements or theses which would be hard to verify, or an occasional intermixing 
of facts and judgments. To the first category belongs, e. g., the reference to Edward 
Kennedy as a U.S. president (p. 51), or the Statement that Jan Masaryk had visited 
the Czechoslovak units in the Middle East (p. 54). The only Czech ministerial 
visitor there was Defense Minister Sergej Ingr who made a brief, strictly formal 
appearance in June 1942. The reviewer findsit impossible to verify some particulars 
about the activities of Soviet agent Otto Katz, alias André Simone, in the West, 
in particular his alleged influence on Jan Masaryk. If the later was really the 
čase, it would surely be a testimony of Masaryk's surprising political naiveté. 
Unverifiable seem also the speculations about Sikorski's death (p. 79) and a few 
other passages pertaining to Jan Masaryk (e. g. p. 109—110). 
In this context the only major question mark has to be mentioned, relating to 
Svitak's brilliant exposé. Throughout the major part of his book Sviták suggests 
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that Jan Masaryk pursued, or tried to pursue, different courses of policy from 
those of his superior Edvard Beneš, that he had substantial reservations and 
occasionally voiced open criticism of the official pro-Soviet policies and even 
of the Soviet Union. Only in the last chapters beginning with the 1947 Marshall 
plan fiasco does the author expand on the tragic dilemma and the failure of the 
populär Foreign Minister. 
The reviewer shares Svitak's sympathy for this „entertaming cosmopolite 
and playboy" (p. 18) or, more seriously, for this well-meaning humane personality 
imbued with western humanitarian traditions. Yet, one should not fail to ask: 
why did Jan Masaryk serve throughout the war, after the war and even after the 
communist coup in a function carrying official responsibility for Czechoslovak 
foreign policy? He must have known from the beginning that major foreign politi­
cal decisions in wartime were bound to be taken by Beneš. They were after all 
his lifelong specialization, and Jan Masaryk saw in him the great experienced 
statesman anyway. Sviták himself shows how restricted Masaryk was after the 
war, not only by the decisions of the National Front but, in the last analysis, by 
the Moscow center. Masaryk's own remarks show how painfully he registered 
this fact. 
Jan Masaryk could — should — have retired from his post of Foreign Minister 
after Benes's December 1943 Moscow visit. It would not have been necessary 
for him to join the ineffectual anti-Beneš Opposition of Hodža, Osuský or 
Prchala. He could have retired in honor, as Bechyně or Nečas were forced to do. 
He could have asked for a transfer to a post of minor governmental responsibility, 
as was occupied for instance by another critic of Benes's policy, Ladislav Feier­
abend. Or he could have resumed his earlier diplomatic career, be it in London, 
Washington or elsewhere. But Jan Masaryk labored on, in spite of his mounting 
inner revulsion, in spite of his bitter jokes, up to and even beyond February 1948. 
Hence he cannot escape his share of responsibility. For whatever reasons, this 
gentle and kind man proved unable to leave Edvard Beneš up to the bitter end. 
He paid for it by his life. 
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Karl Josef Hahn gehört zu jenen sudetendeutschen Intellektuellen, die sich in 
den dreißiger Jahren in der Welt zurechtfinden mußten. Er promovierte 1935 mit 
einer Arbeit über Stefan George. In Karlsbad aufgewachsen, hatte er die Welt-
läufigkeit im Kleinen in der Atmosphäre dieser Bäderstadt in sich aufgenommen, 
die drei böhmischen Komponenten, einen deutschen Vater, eine tschechische Mutter 
und eine jüdische Ehepartnerin, mit ins Leben genommen und zugleich den immen­
sen Bildungs- und Lesehunger eines vitalen Intellekts genährt, seine sprachliche 
